








It is one of the ironies of history that Charles Darwin wasn’t the real founder of Social 
Darwinism. If one were pressed to pick out a single founder, it must be Herbert 
Spencer. This fact alone is enough to indicate the complex nature of the interaction 
between Darwin’s empirical work and its application to human social and moral 
behavior. Some years before the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, Herbert 
Spencer, had argued that Nature deals with the healthy by letting them survive and 
with the weak by letting them die. We should therefore do likewise in human society: 
“If they are sufficiently complete to live, they do live, and it is well they should live; 
if they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is well they should die.”1 
Such an attitude towards nature and society was quite widespread before Darwin. The 
basic features of this attitude included the belief that Nature produced inequalities. As 
a consequence, social phenomena must be explained in terms of competition, conflict 
and the equilibrium and adjustment that results from this. 
Darwin’s specific contribution came from his two core principles: first, that all 
species are descended from one progenitor; and second, that the mechanism how this 
descent occurs is natural selection. Biologists today may leave it as an open question 
whether one should assume just one progenitor or perhaps a very small number, and 
whether or not natural selection is the only mechanism involved. Nevertheless, we can 
say that Darwin’s two core principles, which determine a unique research program in 
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the history of science, have withstood more than a hundred years of scrutiny. Is it 
possible to separate the scientific core of his theory from extrapolations of it to moral 
and social theory? Is it possible to separate the scientist Darwin from the ideological 
Darwin? Anyone who wants to answer in the affirmative would have to start with 
Darwin himself. Darwin himself saw his own work as extendable, without losing its 
continuity, from empirical observation of animal characteristics to questions related to 
morals and religion. As Spencer and others had done before him, Darwin considered 
it an essential part of his intellectual task to extrapolate his core principles to areas 
beyond the horizon of strictly empirical study. He worked out theories of the 
evolution of cognitive dispositions or habits, of ethics, and even of religious behavior. 
For instance, in his 1871 work The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 
he asked: are high moral standards advantageous? As regards the community, he 
answered in the affirmative. He observed that a tribe with self-sacrificing individuals 
would have survival advantage over another tribe without such individuals. In the 
long run, this results in natural selection. And hence, what he called “standards of 
morality” tend to rise, in the sense that tribes with individuals open to the possibility 
of self-sacrifice tend to outlive other kinds of tribes.2 Since then, many other thinkers 
took up Darwin’s project of extrapolating evolutionary explanation so as to engage 
with philosophy of mind, ethics, and social and political philosophy. Not all of them 
agree on the extent to which such an extrapolation is legitimate. At one extreme we 
find some who insist that philosophy and natural science don’t mix, and should 
therefore be kept apart. For these, natural selection in the evolution of hominids is 
completely irrelevant for the resolution of problems in these areas. At the other 
extreme, we find other thinkers insisting that philosophical problems we have been 
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facing since time immemorial have been, and are being, resolved steadily as natural 
science pushes ahead.  
 The area represented by the middle ground between these two extremes is not 
easy to navigate. The issues as they stand today are multifaceted and compound, 
branching out into various areas of philosophy and theology. It is one of the aims of 
this chapter to add some clarity into this complex area of inquiry. I intend to do this 
with special attention to two traditions: the secular and the religious. In part one, I will 
concentrate on purely philosophical issues, tracing the development of the idea of 
social Darwinism, from its origins to the present day. At the end of this first part, I 
will be in a position to determine one major root problem that is blocking further 
progress in the current state of things. In part two, I will shift into the religious mode 
of inquiry. I will give a sketch of the main features of the reaction to social 
Darwinism that arose from Catholic scholarship. I will then proceed by determining, 
from within this Catholic tradition, the main root problem of social Darwinism as 
perceived from the religious viewpoint. These two lines of inquiry will enable us then 
to appreciate the extent to which the root problems determinable from secular, 
philosophical inquiry correspond to the root problems determinable from the Catholic 
tradition.3  
 
1. SOCIAL DARWINISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Darwin’s attempts at explaining moral and social behavior illustrate a social 
theory in the making, itself situated within a wider paradigm. This wider world-view 
had various characteristics. It included, for instance, an overall slant towards 
materialist explanation of human psychological and social affairs. It included also, as 
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a consequence, a suspicion as regards any supernatural forces. The view that human 
beings were somehow evolved from non-human organisms was already present before 
Darwin. Moreover, even before Darwin’s time, the search had been on for biological 
laws that would explain the entire range of living organisms. Many authors had 
discussed the fact that population growth affects the way living things compete for 
resources. The historian Mike Hawkins describes this paradigm by mentioning four 
features:  
This world view [...] consisted of the following elements: (i) biological laws 
governed the whole of organic nature, including humans; (ii) the pressure of 
population growth on resources generated a struggle for existence among 
organisms; (iii) physical and mental traits conferring an advantage on their 
possessors in the struggle (or in sexual competition), could, through 
inheritance, spread through the population; (iv) the cumulative effects of 
selection and inheritance over time accounted for the emergence of new 
species and the elimination of others.4 
What Darwin added to this paradigm was a robust empirical basis. After the 
publication of the Origin of Species, supernatural and teleological accounts of species 
formation lost much of their previous plausibility. The urge to extend the natural-
selection mode of explanation beyond the physical properties of humans became 
stronger and stronger. Social Darwinism, from that period onwards, can therefore be 
described as follows. It is the research program in which what Darwin did for physical 
and biological features is assumed extendible to human social existence and also to 
human psychological attributes that determine the modalities of this social existence, 
especially morality and religion.5 
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 This program, of course, didn’t proceed without its share of opposition. To 
obtain some idea of the various kinds of challenges it had to face, the first thing one 
needs to keep in mind is that Social Darwinism was “a broad church”.6 On the one 
hand we have people like Thomas Robert Malthus who had prepared the background 
by highlighting the mutual dependence between population growth and conditions for 
survival. He argued that the less deprived will face more demanding conditions, 
because population grows at a geometric rate while food resources can only grow at 
an arithmetic rate. This preliminary trace of Social Darwinism can therefore be seen 
as that paradigm’s pessimistic trend. On the other hand, we find Herbert Spencer, who 
was transforming biological thinking, albeit in its Lamarckian form, into a robust 
social philosophy with implications for economics, this time in an optimistic way. He 
emphasized a laissez-faire attitude that, according to him, guarantees progress. Both 
flanks had to face opposition. Malthusian thinking had to respond to the objection that 
an increase in population doesn’t only mean an increase in need for resources but also 
an increase in productivity. Spencer’s writings had to respond to objections related to 
the foundations of ethics. G.E. Moore argued in his Principia Ethica that Spencer had 
committed the naturalistic fallacy. According to Moore, Spencer errs because he 
allegedly substituted a non-natural property, namely goodness in itself, by a natural 
property, namely survivability.7 The wider ramifications of this “broad church” gave 
rise to controversies that had international significance and survived all through the 
twentieth century. Social Darwinism was linked to the eugenic movements in the 
USA and in Nazi Germany, and was also implicated within the nature-nurture debate 
in the development of human anthropology. On the one hand, anthropological studies 
in the first decades of the twentieth century, for instance those carried out by Margaret 
Mead, suggested that most human action is a result of environmental conditioning and 
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not of genetic constitution. These studies therefore tended to undermine Social 
Darwinism. On the other hand, more recent studies in molecular genetics, like those 
of W.D. Hamilton in 1964, and E.O. Wilson in 1975, started supplying empirical 
evidence on how a specific genetic constitution indeed determines, to some extent at 
least, what humans do.8 
 The unifying characteristic of all the variations of Social Darwinism seems to 
lie in their common assumption. They all assume that humans, like other animals, 
compete for existence and that this fundamental feature explains the most useful 
aspects of social and political reality. If this assumption is made stronger, a more 
radical position results. If, in other words, we assume that the competition for 
existence explains not just most aspects of social and political reality but all of that 
reality, we end up with sociobiology. This position involves the idea of reduction. It 
works with the assumption that disciplines that have been up to now considered non-
empirical, like ethics, psychology, social and political theory, are indeed entirely 
empirical after all. They are branches of biology. Sociobiology therefore can be 
considered an extreme version of Social Darwinism: a naturalistic Social Darwinism.9 
Of course, naturalism is most often described with respect to physics: physics is taken 
to be the core, or the only, discipline that matters in all philosophical topics. Here we 
have naturalism with respect to biology. Society is assumed totally explainable just 
like flora or fauna. There are various levels of organization, and each is explainable in 
terms of evolution propagated by blind variation and natural selection alone. 
Moreover, human society, just like the rest of the organic world, is explainable in 
terms of purposes, goals, and functions of systems situated within larger systems.10 
 With these general features of Social Darwinism in view, we can now 
appreciate some typical arguments in its favor in current literature. A good source is 
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Michael Ruse’s Taking Darwin Seriously. In this book, he takes the most convincing 
justification for sociobiology to be the success with which altruistic behavior in 
animals has been explained by kin selection and reciprocal action.11 A group of 
organisms that includes self-sacrificing individuals has a higher chance of survival 
than a group that doesn’t. Altruistic behavior results when two principles are at work. 
It happens when the individual is, first, more likely to help close kin rather than 
distant ones, and, second, when that individual helps another with the expectation of 
having the favor returned. Ruse argues that, for some organisms, these conditions are 
indeed satisfied. Moreover, humans are such animals. Therefore their altruistic 
behavior is fully explainable in this naturalistic way.  
 What are the hidden logical nuances of this argument? In line with the 
sociobiology program sketched above, Ruse is essentially explaining, in purely 
naturalistic terms, one of the fundamental moral traits of human behavior. The 
suggestion is that what we can do as regards altruism may be done also as regards 
other moral habits. So the outcome of such an explanatory project seems to be 
inevitable: we are heading towards global determinism as regards human culture, 
because every human act would be seen as the outcome of biological mechanisms. 
Ruse is aware of this, and he tries to avoid such a slippery slope by a simple claim. He 
insists that arguments like the one about altruism are only about constraints our 
evolutionary past has established – nothing else. So he writes: “The question is not 
whether every last act of Western man or woman is governed by kin selection or 
reciprocal altruism or some such thing. I am sure it is not.”12  
It is interesting to note that, in the very same book, he himself renders such an 
excuse somewhat ineffective. At one point he tries to remain at the level of broad, 
general principles allegedly touching only some constraints. At other places, he 
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presents his thesis as relevant for the entire spectrum including both meta-ethics and 
normative ethics. In meta-ethics, we try to explain why humans adopt the moral 
principles that they in fact adopt. For instance, as regards altruism, we assume that 
humans show this tendency, the habit of helping others via self-sacrifice, as a 
common characteristic. Notice therefore that those engaged in a meta-ethical inquiry 
are not concerned with questions dealing with specific applicability, such as: “Should 
I be altruistic in this specific case?” The basic form of the question they are interested 
in is: “Why do we have this habit, most of us, most of the time, when it seems, at face 
value, to go against the survival of the fittest?” Habit and principle here merge into 
each other. Ruse is right in claiming that sociobiology is relevant here. As regards 
normative ethics, the relevance is less obvious. In normative ethics, the major focus is 
on the action to be done, not on the habits of the agent. The typical question here is of 
the form: “Should I do action A in this specific situation?” or “What am I obliged to 
do in this specific situation?” At first sight, it may appear that evolutionary 
explanation cannot be a useful resource for normative ethics, especially if we accept 
that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. We may however make evolutionary 
explanation relevant by inserting an ethical bridge-principle. And this is precisely 
what evolutionary ethics sometimes purports to do. It introduces the idea that: “we 
ought to do what is in line with our normal biological functioning”. The plausibility of 
such an ethical bridge-principle makes Ruse’s suggestion that sociobiology is relevant 
for both meta-ethics and normative ethics quite appealing. His caution as regards 
sliding towards global determinism doesn’t stop him from supplying impressive 
arguments in support of Social Darwinism in its strongest form.  
In spite of the attraction of extending evolutionary explanation beyond 
biology, there have been various arguments advanced against sociobiology.13 I will 
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concentrate on one major issue only, one which has been somewhat neglected. I will 
focus on the very nature of intentional states. My basic claim is that the application of 
evolutionary explanation to moral, social and political philosophy tends to work with 
a view of intentional states that is to some extent distorted. Because of this, it ends up 
leaving some essential properties of human society out of consideration.  
 In what follows, the crucial assumption is that, although our main focus is 
Social Darwinism, it is often useful to start from more basic considerations.14 Take 
the human sciences in general. On close inspection, one realizes that a serious 
challenge arises because of the special character of mental states. Naturalists confront 
this challenge by adopting the methods of empirical science. For natural scientists, 
laws of nature in general are relations between some variables, and these variables are 
chosen in a specific way. The variables must, first of all of course, be useful in 
describing the phenomenon under study. They must also, however, be independent of 
each other. They must be both logically independent, in the sense that their meaning is 
accessible independently, and also methodologically independent, in the sense that 
they should be measurable separately. When this basic strategy is applied to ethics 
and social science, naturalists assume the existence of laws that express links between 
desires, beliefs and actions, and maybe some other elements of our normal way of 
behavior. So here we have the set of variables for this kind of inquiry. A typical law 
would be: for any human individual x, if x desires q, and x believes that doing action 
A is the best means of attaining q, then x does A. This is practically saying that the 
relations between intentional states and actions are assumed to be explainable on the 
model of causation in physics.  
 Is this viable? The major problem lies with one of the underlying assumptions. 
When we assume that what works for science must work also for ethics and society, 
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we are assuming that intentional states are independent variables, while in fact they 
are not. They are, in fact, logically inter-dependent because of their intentional 
content. To determine the content of a belief or a desire, you need to ask the person 
who has them what he or she really believes or desires. Likewise, to determine an 
action, observing the bodily movement is not enough. This fundamental point rules 
out physics as a model for social and ethical explanation. Does it rule out biology as 
well? Admittedly, biology differs from physics in various ways. Evolutionary 
biology, for instance, is interested not in the relation between variables associated 
with a particular individual agent, but in what happens to average values of traits 
within a group.15 Could it be that, because of this shift in viewpoint from individual to 
group, the problematic mutual dependence between specific beliefs, desires and 
actions vanishes as we zoom out, as it were, from the scenario involving the 
individual? If it does vanish, or become negligible, then evolutionary explanation will 
indeed be applicable to social and ethical issues. 
 Only some further analysis, however, is needed to show that no such vanishing 
occurs. The problematic mutual dependence between beliefs, desires and actions 
resurfaces at all levels. At the level of the individual, this dependence is clear, as 
mentioned above. At the level of the group, mutual dependence between belief, desire 
and action takes the form of reflexivity. This term is used by critical theorists who are 
sensitive to the fact that knowledge and truth are dependent on human interests. For 
my purposes here, we can take the term reflexivity to refer to the fact that, in the 
human sciences, the objects under study (human beings) are not left undisturbed by 
the theories proposed to describe them. In concrete terms, this means that when a 
group is told about a theory proposed to explain its behavior patterns, the group is not 
only capable of shifting its behavior away from what is predicted, but very often does 
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precisely that. The history of humanity gives ample evidence of this kind of reaction. 
And this shows how beliefs, desires and actions remain intertwined at the group level 
as well. The upshot is that evolutionary explanation of social and ethical behavior 
needs some fundamental revision even to get off the ground.16 
Could it be that Social Darwinism is still defensible in spite of this problem? 
The only way forward is to claim that Social Darwinism is good for some aspects, but 
not for all aspects of moral and social behavior. Philip Kitcher seems to defend this 
middle-ground position. It is a position that corresponds very well, I think, to most 
people’s pre-philosophical intuitions. His main point is that Darwinism, as an 
explanatory tool, has to be used with caution. When people appeal to natural selection 
in order to draw conclusions about psychological faculties and moral or social 
dispositions, their argument is always vulnerable. It is always open to the challenge 
that alternative explanations in these areas are possible. At best, a Darwinian 
explanation supplies us with an explanation not of how human morality and human 
social dispositions evolved but of how they might have evolved. To conclude his 
paper, Kitcher writes:  
Darwin’s great achievement doesn’t make all other considerations and 
disciplines irrelevant, and, in particular, it shouldn’t lead us to dismiss the 
potential insights of pre-Darwinian philosophizing. My recommendations for 
applying evolutionary ideas within philosophy are, I trust, obvious from my 
illustrative examples, and their prevailing character is one of cautious 
exploration. Darwin deserves his due, neither more nor less.17 
In the terminology used above, Kitcher seems to be assuming, deep down, that 
intentionality can be divided into two layers. The lower layer corresponds to 
instinctive behavior; the upper level to non-instinctive behavior, where action is the 
231 
 
result of conscious deliberation. For instinctive behavior, beliefs, desires and actions 
are so simple that they are indeed independent variables. A Skinner-type stimulus-
response scenario involves a person with a simple desire-belief-action sequence, such 
as when someone acts “mechanically”, as we often say. Are there real desires, beliefs, 
and actions in these scenarios? Many of us would say yes. They are genuine desires, 
beliefs and actions, but they are not the object of our attention. They are not the object 
of attention either because the individual is alienated with something else, or because 
the individual is being carried along by the crowd. When, as it were, I don’t look 
straight at my desires, beliefs or actions, I live in the mechanical mode. At any 
moment, however, I can stop and attend to them. When I do so, these intentional 
states become the object of my self-reflection. Up to now, I’ve been discussing the 
individual. But the argument applies also to a group. A group, or even the species 
taken as a whole, has beliefs, desires and is engaged in action. It is fully conscious of 
some of these beliefs, desires and actions. It may however be unaware of others. 
Hence, just as in the individual’s case, the group can stop and attend to itself, in a 
moment of group self-reflection. In this way, its hitherto mechanical beliefs, desires 
and actions start becoming interdependent. It is therefore by attending to them, that 
the individual or group will detach itself from the picture supplied by the Darwinist 
account of social and ethical reality. Here we have the second layer of intentionality.
 Kitcher’s position seems balanced and plausible. Nevertheless, if I’m right 
about this hidden assumption involving two levels, it starts showing worrying signs of 
over-simplification. The idea of a clear boundary between intentional states in the 
mechanical mode and intentional states in the non-mechanical, or free, mode looks 
too good to be true. I fear that the world is messier than we often wish it to be. If, in 
our understanding of mental properties and of practical reason, we follow the route of 
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Aristotle, as reworked recently by D. Davidson and J. McDowell, we’ll see that there 
cannot be any clear distinction between empirical content and conceptual scheme. 
This essentially means that what I have been calling mechanical beliefs, desires or 
actions aren’t beliefs, desires or actions at all. Once humans become aware of 
anything – once they become aware of cognitive dispositions, of basic wants or urges, 
or of possible control over bodily movement – their rationality is engaged, whether 
they like it or not. A mechanical action, after all, is, in so far as it is deprived of 
intention, not ethical. So what is the major issue in this entire debate? Even this very 
quick glance at mental properties and practical reason is enough to show that the 
major issue is human freedom. If Social Darwinism explains anything about humans, 
it explains what lies outside free deliberation. It explains what lies outside the 
specifically human.  
Let me recapitulate: the aim of this section was to determine one of the root 
problems that is blocking further progress. I’ve structured my reasoning by listing 
some arguments in favor of Social Darwinism and some against. Concentrating only 
on intentional states, I’ve come to the conclusion that, when we apply evolutionary 
explanation to moral, social and political philosophy, we tend to ignore the basic fact 
that the content of human beliefs, desires and action are inter-dependent. We tend to 
disregard the human ability to react against constraints. The root problem is the 
stubborn fact of human freedom with respect to natural constraints. 
 
2. SOCIAL DARWINISM: THE RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 
 
 We shift now to the religious viewpoint. The interaction of Social Darwinism 
with Christianity has taken many forms. A quick historical glance shows that clashes 
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occurred principally around the following four areas.18 First, Christianity defends the 
idea of human nature or human essence, and considers this indispensable as a basis 
for freedom. Social Darwinists, on the contrary, work with the assumption that there 
is no such thing as a fixed human nature or essence. This clash was first explicitly 
pointed out as early as 1866 in the first French translation of Darwin’s Origin of 
Species.19 One needs to add here, however, that, since those early years, ideas on this 
point have evolved. Within the Darwinian camp, defenders of punctuated equilibrium 
have highlighted the fact that, although speciation is possible, species usually remain 
unchanged over long stretches of time; moreover, speciation occurs only within 
relatively brief intervals. Within the phylum that includes humans, significant 
biological changes haven’t occurred for thousands of years. It is plausible to consider 
this point a satisfactory justification for the idea that, although human nature or 
human essence may not be fixed, it is virtually timeless. The second area of 
dissonance occurred because Christianity considers universal brotherhood as possible, 
and in fact never ceases to encourage people to strive to achieve it. Social Darwinists, 
on the contrary, insisted that human divisions are perennial because they are founded 
on tribal conflict. Humans in fact can never escape their dual mentality of being 
locally friendly, but globally belligerent.20 Thirdly, Christianity considers herself the 
channel of God’s revelation to humanity, and, especially within the Catholic tradition, 
sees religion and science as necessarily harmonious with each other as they issue from 
the same source, God. On the contrary, influential, popular, Social Darwinists like 
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) argued that science and religion are in direct and eternal 
conflict and that what is valid in Christianity was taken from other cultures and what 
is specific to it is wrong.21 Fourthly, Christian tradition, especially within Catholicism 
and the Orthodox traditions, sees a vital spiritual value in priestly celibacy and in the 
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idea of belonging to a community of shared norms. Social Darwinists opposed this. 
They argued that priestly celibacy is an encumbrance to society because it reduces the 
best offspring, and that conformity and tolerance blocks the purity of the superior 
race.22  
 In spite of these areas of contention, the interaction of Social Darwinism with 
Christianity has enjoyed elements of constructive dialogue. For many centuries before 
Darwin’s days, the Catholic intellectual tradition had been engaged in social and 
political philosophy in various ways. In spite of such a sustained effort, no complete, 
systematic theory of society has ever been formulated and officially sanctioned, even 
to this day. One sees rather a general attempt at highlighting a number of principles 
that must be respected at all costs. Social Darwinism has represented an opportunity 
for Catholic scholars to explore areas that had hitherto been neglected or simply 
ignored. I will proceed by examining three of these principles.  
The first one deals with realism as regards the nature of all created things, 
including societies. Drawing from Aristotle and Augustine, official Catholic doctrine 
has always highlighted the idea of the autonomy of each aspect of reality: “created 
things and societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which must be 
gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men.”23 The basic tenet of faith that 
God is the creator of everything justifies the assumption that all processes unfold 
according to their own laws. This holds not only for physical reality but for biological 
and social reality as well. To avoid sliding towards the idea that the goodness of the 
Creator ensures an easy access to these laws, the acknowledgment of this realism 
needs to be counterbalanced. It is counterbalanced by recalling the enormous 
complexity of reality: not only of physical reality, but also of biological and especially 
human reality. Any trace of reductionism in social explanation should therefore be 
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viewed with suspicion. A typical statement highlighting this caution is found in an 
official text that expresses concern about the straightforward application of Marxist 
doctrines to society: “In the human and social sciences it is well to be aware above all 
of the plurality of methods and viewpoints, each of which reveals only one aspect of 
reality which is so complex that it defies simple and univocal explanation.”24 This 
caution is valid not only for Marxist explanation. It is valid also for Social Darwinism, 
for both explanations are practically always taken to be exhaustive.  
This point leads naturally to the second principle highlighted within the 
Catholic tradition as regards social reality: the danger of having social theory hijacked 
by dangerous ideology. The usual victim of such hijacking is human freedom. That 
the application of Darwinism to social explanation is easy prey for ideology has been 
highlighted not only by religion-inspired scholars but also by others.25 The possibility 
of distortion arises because, in explaining a given social aspect, one can often choose 
the variables deliberately to support a hidden agenda.26 Social Darwinism has often 
been used in this way to support various forms of determinism that undermine moral 
responsibility. 
Now, one needs to recall that the Catholic tradition does not say that human 
deliberation and choice are not determined in any way. The Augustinian and 
Thomistic heritage grapples with the question of freedom in relation to God’s fore-
knowledge and God’s omnipotence. Aquinas had no problem with proposing that the 
human will is, in its very nature, strictly determined toward an object recognized 
intellectually as the universal good. For him, human freedom is only possible when 
humans deal with particular goods.27 In such cases, deliberation and choice are indeed 
affected by the physical state of the individual. For instance, a person may be more 
emotional than another, or more impulsive than another, according to each person’s 
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temperament and prior conditioning. There may also be unconscious influences. 
Individuals are often not fully aware of all that is affecting their deliberation and 
choice. Nevertheless, it is legitimate in such cases to consider them free in the sense 
that they are deliberating and choosing consciously, while having the added 
commitment to uncover as many as possible of the hidden influences. When Social 
Darwinists therefore argue that moral choices are conditioned by habits hammered 
into human living in the course of hominid evolution, they are not out of line with the 
Catholic tradition. When they claim however that, because of such habits, moral 
choices are illusory, they are seen as contravening the basic principle of human 
freedom.  
Not to remain too much on the abstract level, we may consider the particular 
example of economics and laissez-faire, or unrestricted, capitalism. As mentioned 
above, H. Spencer’s writings on Social Darwinism had proposed that an economic 
system should allow businesses to operate with little or no government interference. 
With such an outlook, the role of society’s deliberation and choice is reduced to a 
minimum. There is no trace of the fact that human beings are the sort of creature that, 
once a previously hidden influence on the run of things becomes visible, they become 
capable of deliberating about it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, this 
kid of deliberation actually erupted in the United States, when state and federal 
governments came under pressure to regulate unrestricted capitalism via legislation on 
working conditions, wages, and child labor.28 In a recent official document, which 
offers a synthesis of much work from the Catholic tradition, one finds an explicit 
reference to this tension between, on the one hand, social forces that may be 
accounted for in terms of Darwinian principles and, on the other hand, human 
freedom and responsibility: 
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The free market cannot be judged apart from the ends that it seeks to 
accomplish and from the values that it transmits on a societal level. Indeed, the 
market cannot find in itself the principles for its legitimization; it belongs to the 
consciences of individuals and to public responsibility to establish a just 
relationship between means and ends. The individual profit of an economic 
enterprise, although legitimate, must never become the sole objective. Together 
with this objective there is another, equally fundamental but of a higher order: 
social usefulness, which must be brought about not in contrast to but in keeping 
with the logic of the market. When the free market carries out the important 
functions mentioned above it becomes a service to the common good and to 
integral human development.29 
The suggestion here is that the laissez-faire mentality is not wrong in itself but is to be 
judged according to its service to the common good. The element of freedom and 
responsibility remains: a good illustration of the second principle I wanted to 
highlight, a principle that emerges in a new light because of the interaction between 
Social Darwinism and Catholic thought. 
 The third principle concerns the dignity of the human person. For an explicit 
formulation of this principle, in relation to evolutionary explanation, one may refer to 
a section of Pope John Paul II’s address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences 
delivered in 1996: “Theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies 
inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of living matter or as a 
mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are incompatible with the truth about man. Nor 
are they able to ground the dignity of the person.”30 The suggestion here is that, to be 
acceptable, any philosophy of evolutionary biology, and also any associated social 
theory, must consign to the human person absolute value. The theory must be able to 
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ground the dignity of the person. This requirement is being presented as a constraint 
on the various possible uses of evolutionary explanation in understanding human 
reality. Hence, giving less importance to the individual person than to the genes that 
partially constitute him or her is unacceptable. Giving less importance to the 
individual person than to the aggregate (species or society), to which that person 
belongs is likewise unacceptable. The person comes first. No person is to be 
considered merely an instrument for the survival of the species. No person is to be 
considered merely a carrier of an exotic gene.  
 On this particular point, the fiercest ideological battles were fought in debates 
concerning Eugenics. The advent of Darwinism encouraged the consideration of the 
human phenomenon from new perspectives. It encouraged the study of traits, over and 
above the consideration of human individuals. It encouraged the study of populations, 
again over and above the consideration of individuals. The systematic study of 
methods for hereditary improvement of human population by controlled selective 
breeding arose concurrently with Darwin’s work. In spite of this however, eugenics is 
quite distinct from Social Darwinism. Eugenics represents a kind of “reverse-
engineered” version of Social Darwinism. Darwin had started from the model of goal-
directed animal-husbandry, and then moved on to the elimination of purpose. In 
eugenics we find the opposite. Francis Galton uses Darwin’s views on natural 
selection to return to goal-directed human intervention: hence the popular idea that 
eugenics is the self-direction of human evolution. Having said that, however, we need 
to recall that the aim behind eugenics is very often in line with Social Darwinism. The 
idea of a struggle for survival is always in the background. What we often see within 
the eugenics movement is an acknowledgement that the struggle for survival of one 
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particular race needs to be carried out intelligently and methodically. The upshot is: 
eugenics and Social Darwinism are strange bedfellows. 
 There is a lot to say about the complex reaction of the Catholic Church to the 
eugenic movement, especially to the forms that movement adopted in Nazi 
Germany.31 I will concentrate on one foundational point only, a point that illustrates 
the principle of the irreplaceable value of the individual person. This one foundational 
point is that, although there is much to condemn in the philosophy of eugenics, there 
are some elements that are in harmony with genuine human flourishing. Only if we 
highlight the value of the individual person, can we determine these positive elements 
in line with human flourishing. No one can deny that there is a moral obligation for 
one generation to ensure that the next generation enjoys a quality of life better than its 
own, or a quality of life at least as good as its own. For a correct judgment on how 
this can be achieved, one must respect the right priorities that determine the 
individual’s deliberations. Hence, physical well-being cannot be taken to override 
moral and spiritual well-being. Such ideas were expressed by Catholic scholars not 
only in learned works but also in pamphlets directed to the masses. For instance, 
Thomas Gerrard in 1912 published a booklet entitled The Church and Eugenics. He 
explains how “instinct shall be ministrant to intelligence, and intelligence ministrant 
to love”.32 In the same vein he writes: “the physical element in man must always be 
subordinate to the psychic and the psychic to the spiritual”.33 His point is not that we 
should disregard or hinder the lower aspects. It is rather to care for them, but to do so 
in so far as they enhance the development of the higher aspects. The main question 
then emerges therefore is: what is the ideal that humans should seek? Gerrard argues 
that genuine Catholic doctrine brings out the best in eugenics. The Catholic “ideal” is 
neither Nietzsche’s Über-Mensch, nor the humanists’ Ideal Scientist or Ideal Artist. It 
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is rather the genius in morality and holiness, or, in other words, the saint. He 
concludes: “Catholicism then, far from seeking to hinder eugenic reform, seeks rather 
to promote it by setting it on a lasting basis, the basis of the spirit”.34 Gerrard’s 
arguments are a good illustration of the Catholic trend to defend the dignity of the 
individual. The individual’s freedom and responsibility explains why no one is to be 




In part one, I concentrated on purely philosophical issues, especially those 
dealing with intentional states. I arrived at the conclusion that one of the major 
problems concerns human freedom with respect to natural constraints, whether these 
constraints arise from immediate physical limitations or from more long-term 
conditioning. In part two, I explored some aspects of the way Social Darwinism 
interacted with Christian thought, especially in the Catholic tradition. In this regard, 
the religious viewpoint has highlighted three principles: realism as regards social 
reality; the danger of having social theory hijacked by dangerous ideology; and the 
absolute value of the person. These two parts of this chapter represent two distinct 
lines of inquiry, one deriving its inspiration from reason and observation; the other 
from reason, observation and religious faith. It is interesting to see how both lines of 
inquiry converge onto the same area. They both indicate that there is something 
wrong when Social Darwinism or sociobiology is allowed to stifle human freedom 
and responsibility.  
The basic insight therefore that emerges from the foregoing arguments is that 
even if Social Darwinism or sociobiology supply convincing evidence that social 
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injustice, war, or interpersonal aggression are natural, we are still obliged to exercise 
our freedom with respect to these aspects of human living and to do so responsibly.35 
Social Darwinism and sociobiology do not hinder the role of social policy, still less do 
they eliminate it. On the contrary, they are a help. They tell us where we really stand. 
They facilitate effective planning. Admittedly, it often happens that, when belief-
desire-action sequences are left unattended, both at the level of the individual and at 
the level of society, they tend to become instinctive, ingrained, or mechanical: a kind 
of second nature. When this happens, any unwanted consequences may surprise us. 
This element of surprise should trigger our concern. Darwinism therefore is 
indispensable, not because our freedom is illusory but because we need all the 
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